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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, the policy of inflation targeting which is adopted by many countries as 
main monetary policy has been analyzed. This framework necessitated credibility, 
accountability, transparency and independency of Central Banks in the design and practice of 
monetary policy and in this respect these prerequisites were discussed.  
The outcome of this target as illustrated in this study is its direct effect on expectations 
providing a lesser inflation rate accompanied by a declined level of inflationary tendency. 
This paper also examines the inflation targeting period experienced in Turkey that is divided 
into implicit and explicit sub-periods. The hidden inflation targeting period between 2002 and 
2005 was an inevitable transition period to satisfy primarily preconditions of inflation 
targeting framework and in Turkey which has high and chronicle inflation level and loss of 
credibility this period became effective and useful. Considering the data given in this study, 
after adoption of explicit inflation targeting in 2006, the importance of independency of the 
monetary authority became more significant and the experience in Turkey illustrated the 
effective role of inflation targeting to maintain price stability with the existence of the fiscal 
discipline.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
Bu çalışmada son yıllarda pek çok ülke tarafından temel para politikası olarak kabul 
gören “enflasyon hedeflemesi” politikası incelenmektedir. Bu hedef hesap verme, 
güvenilirlik, şeffaflık ve merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ilkelerini para politikası için gerekli 
kılar. Bu hedeflemenin çalışmamızda açıklanan kesin etkisi enflasyon beklentilerindeki 
düşme üzerindedir.  
Çalışmada ele alınan diğer bir konu Türkiyedeki uygulamalardır. Türkiye’de enflasyon 
hedeflemesi politikası iki ayrı dönem içerisinde incelenmiştir. 2002-2005 arası dönem gizli 
enflasyon hedeflemesi ve 2006 sonrası dönem “Açık enflasyon hedeflemesi” olarak 
adlandırılan dönemlerdir ki; birincisi Türkiye gibi kronik yüksek enflasyon sorunuyla beraber 
güven kaybını da yaşayan ülkeler için enflasyon hedeflemesi politikasının önkoşullarını 
sağlamada  kaçınılmaz olarak faydalı ve etkilidir. Bu geçiş döneminin ardından Türkiye’de 
2006 sonrası açık enflasyon politikası ile para otoritelerinin bağımsızlığı önem kazanmış ve 
böyle bir ortamda enflasyon hedeflemesi fiyat istikrarını sağlamada etkin bir rol oynamıştır. 
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Introduction: 
 
 Inflation targeting is a new monetary regime with respect to the other monetary 
policies. This framework was first adopted by New Zealand in 1990 and concurrently, more 
than twenty countries including both industrialized and developing countries have 
introduced this target as a monetary policy. Inflation targeting is a monetary policy in 
which a monetary authority forecasts and announces a targeted inflation rate and uses the 
interest rate as a monetary tool to achieve the planned inflation rate. 
In the first part, critical issues about the design and implementation of inflation 
targeting which technically affects the achievement of inflation targeting, are examined. 
Determining the best measurement techniques, deciding the targeted inflation level, 
choosing the best time to start the implementation of monetary regime and time horizons 
are the technically weak points of inflation targeting regime. In addition, central bank is 
supposed to adjudge to implement a range targeting or a point targeting policy.  Finally, 
central bank arranges the communication path carefully, since communication is one of the 
main pillars of requirements of inflation targeting. 
Secondly, from adopting countries’ experiences, it should be said that, inflation 
targeting is a monetary policy which has significant macroeconomic outcomes, like 
reflecting in the lesser inflation rate accompanied by a declined level of inflationary 
expectations. In many countries this remarkable performance occurred concurrently with a 
decreased nominal effective exchange rate. Additionally, inflation targeting framework 
improves the credibility of monetary authority by effect of increased level of accountability 
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and transparency of central bank’s monetary policy. In contrast to other monetary regimes, 
it reduces the uncertainty in economic environment and future expectations by an 
announced targeted inflation rate. Therefore, as a transparent monetary regime, inflation 
targeting directly affects expectations. It also enhances the communication among central 
bank, private sector, public and government.  
In the third chapter the preconditions and requisites of inflation targeting are 
explored in detail. As a monetary regime, inflation targeting has a number of preconditions 
like independency of central bank and having strong financial markets in economy which 
are supposed to be satisfied before implementation of the target and also, requisites which 
are the inevitable components of implementation, are another issue to discuss. The adopting 
monetary authority has to be credible, transparent in monetary policy and policy 
instrument, accountable and flexible. Besides, monetary authority is supposed to publish 
reports to enhance communication. These periodic reports include the forecasts, targeted 
inflation rate, overall macroeconomic conditions, potential risks against the achievement 
and also if occurs, the causes of deviations from targeted level. 
Finally, in this paper, the inflation targeting period of Turkey has been analyzed. 
Turkey has turned inflation targeting regime in 2006 officially, but inflation targeting 
process actually started in 2002 after February 2001 crisis. In the post-crises period, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey switched to floating exchange rate, instead of fixed 
exchange rate regime. Since, the prerequisites of inflation targeting framework were not 
satisfied, central bank chose to adopt an implicit inflation targeting regime instead of full-
fledged version. The reason lying behind this transition period is the risks of adopting 
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inflation targeting framework without filling the preconditions. In the case of not gratified 
conditions, inflation targeting should lead the economy worsen. That is why, it took time to 
implement inflation targeting regime in Turkey. Therefore, the inflation targeting of Turkey 
would be examined in two divided periods, hidden inflation targeting period between 2002 
and 2005, and inflation targeting period after 2006. In each period, inflation targeting is the 
monetary regime of Turkey with significant macroeconomic outcomes especially in 
lowering and stabilizing the chronicle inflation levels accompanied by a high level of 
credibility of monetary authority. 
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1. Inflation Targeting: 
 
In this chapter, inflation targeting and related economic indicators will be defined. 
Then, inflation targeting, implementation and design of this monetary regime will be 
explained. Additional to implementation, some technical and communication issues about 
framework like level of targeted inflation, distinction between range targeting or strict 
targeted level, time horizons and the best time to adopt the inflation targeting will be 
explored. 
 
1.1. Inflation: 
 
In economics, inflation means a persistent increase in overall prices. Inflation 
presupposes the existence of money, introduction of coins in Lydia and Ionia and China 
about 630 BC. The term of ‘inflation’ is derived from the Latin word inflare which means 
to blow up or inflate and also according to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989) first used 
in the concept of inflation of the currency in 1838. 
There are more terms in economics related to inflation defining the movements and 
fluctuations of price levels. A general decrease in overall price levels is defined as deflation 
and also disinflation is delineated as a reduction in inflation rate. Furthermore, stagflation 
and hyper-inflation are the additional concepts about price levels where stagflation occurs 
in inflation with a rising unemployment rate and hyper-inflation is the uncontrollable 
inflationary circular reasoning. 
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There are many indexes being used to measure the inflation rate in an economy. 
Instances of most conventional measures of inflation are, 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) is a measure of the overall cost of the goods and services 
bought by a typical consumer or an economic agent. 
Cost of Living Index (COLI) measures the change in the cost of a constant basket of goods 
and services, including the services consumed by an economic agent daily like housing, 
electricity, food, and transportation. 
Producer Price Index (PPI) is the total cost of the goods and services received by a 
producer including taxes, price subsidization and profits. 
Wholesale Price Index reflects the alternation of a fixed-basket commodity, a selection of 
goods at wholesale. 
Commodity Price Index calculates the change in the basket of selected commodities which 
are weighted according to importance in respect of the other commodities in the basket. 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Deflator is a measure of the price level calculated as the 
ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP times 100. 
These all indexes are just some of the measurement tools in order to indicate the 
inflation rates. Furthermore, inflation rate is a useful and important parameter defining the 
economic conditions in an economy also a high inflation rate affects economy negatively in 
the way of causing a significant fall in purchasing power parity. 
Three major problems which worsening economic environment, come into being in the 
case of inflation, 
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1. Because of increase in overall price levels, economic agents with constant income 
levels will be worse off in real terms as having the same nominal income with 
higher prices. Thereby, this will lead to a decrease in purchasing power of their 
income. 
2. In open economy, countries trade with each other. If the trading country has a 
higher inflation rate relatively and that country perpetuates a fixed exchange rate 
with other countries, therefore, the country will face off a fall in exports due to 
being more expensive to purchase compared to the countries with low-inflation 
level. Then, this fall will create a deficit in its current account. 
3. Due to increasing price levels, trade unions do not demand higher wage levels as the 
wage increase rates are supposed to keep in step with the inflation rate. According 
to collective bargaining, salaries are an adjustment of price expectations. An 
increasing acceleration in inflation also promotes the expected price levels. This 
circle should beget the case of wage spiral. 
Since high inflation level is a great barricade to a better economic condition, there are 
numbers of methods being used by Central Banks as the Monetary Authority to counteract 
the inflationary process. However, inflation rate 0 percentages have never been succeeded 
yet. Central Banks can make the inflation rate move to a significant scope by using 
monetary policies such like setting interest rates. Keeping the interest rates at high levels 
and slowing down the growth of money supply are the conventional ways in order to 
achieve a lower inflation rate. There are also different approaches called inflation targeting 
followed by Central Banks newly, to prevent inflation. 
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1.2. Inflation Targeting as a Framework: 
 
It is well known that the ultimate goal of the monetary policy is the price 
stabilization and the inevitable question is ‘what is the most effective strategy to achieve 
this important and ultimate target?’ For decades, many central banks, monetary authorities 
and academicians discussed about a number of different strategies to decide which one is 
the most efficient and effective way. Inflation targeting is one of these strategies which are 
seen as a better way to achieve price stabilization. 
Inflation targeting is a framework for monetary policy characterized by the public 
announcement of official quantitative targets or target ranges for the inflation rate over one 
or more time horizons, and by explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is 
monetary policy’s primary long-run goal. (Bernanke, 1999)1 
In 1990, The Central Bank of New Zealand is the first monetary authority which 
implemented ‘the inflation targeting framework’ and, up till now about twenty Central 
Banks adopted inflation targeting approach. Concurrently, much theoretical work deals 
with this framework. This has superseded the monetary policy tools being implemented 
those are using targets for the exchange rate or monetary aggregates. Currently a significant 
number of emerging-market economies and developing economies have embarked to apply 
this framework, induced by the accomplishment of inflation-targeting countries in 
                                                 
1 See Bernanke, Ben; Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin, Adam S. Posen ‘Inflation Targeting /Lessons 
from International Experience’ (1999) for the definition of inflation targeting monetary regime as a 
framework. 
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achieving and catching low levels of inflation. However, initially inflation targeting-based 
monetary regimes were implemented by industrialized, developed countries. 
As its name suggests, in inflation targeting, price stabilization is the main goal of 
monetary regime, and the inflation target uses nominal anchor during the implementation of 
monetary policy. The main difference of the inflation targeting that distinguishes the 
inflation targeting policy from other monetary regimes is directly affecting the expected 
inflation rate by announcing the level targeted. The implementation process starts by 
declaring the target and policy tools will be used in achievement to public in regular time 
horizons. Thereby, it directly affects not only the expected inflation rate but also influences 
the price and wage settings. This is an important part of the rationale for inflation targeting.  
However, it is strongly defended that inflation targeting has positive effects on expectations 
and generally, from the experiences of adopted countries, results with better 
macroeconomic outcomes, cooperation is key point of the policy that leads to success. 
Cooperation among public, central bank, government and also private sector contributes to 
the success of the regime. It is needless to say that credibility of the monetary authority 
provides this cooperation, in other words, as economic agents believe in that monetary 
authority is equal and eligible to design, implement and end the policy up to achievement, 
inflation targeting policy pans out. 
The concept of inflation targeting argues that the main objective of the monetary 
policy is supposed to be to achieve a low and stable inflation level. It is still arguable, but 
the following axioms those support the idea of setting the low inflation level as the primary 
goal are widely accepted by the economists; 
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• Because a rise in the money supply is neutral in the long-run, the employment and also 
output levels are not influenced by a low-inflation based monetary policy. It can be said 
that output gap and also unemployment are not consequences of a decrease in money 
supply. 
• Moreover, it can be added that the allocation of resources and output growth in the long-
run are negatively influenced by a high inflation levels. 
• Contrary to long-run, money is not neutral in the short run. That is to say, monetary policy 
has vital temporary effects on some of real variables, together with output and 
unemployment.  
• Monetary policy imposes the inflation level with lags of uncertain time period and 
changing strength. These lags make the current inflation level difficult to be controlled by 
the central bank on a period-by-period basis. 
These factors make the inflation targeting framework, among a significant number 
of economists, as a monetary regime that improves the economy. Additionally, the 
macroeconomic outcomes of the experienced countries canalize the other countries to adopt 
inflation targeting framework as the monetary regime. However, the consequences of 
inflation targeting are generally in practice rather in theory. 
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1.3. Design and Implementation of Inflation Targeting: 
 
We will analyze the advantages and disadvantages of inflation targeting framework 
in chapter 2. Whether these benefits and costs will be understood, they are primarily 
depends on how efficiently and effectively the inflation targeting is designed and applied. 
Therefore, as the first step the process of inflation targeting framework, implementation and 
design will be focused. 
Recalling the definition of inflation targeting, the concept can be expressed as a 
framework for monetary policy, characterized by the public announcement of official 
quantitative targets or target ranges for the inflation rate, over one or more time horizons, 
and by explicitly acknowledgment that low, stable inflation is monetary policy primary 
long-run goal (Bernanke, Mishkin, 1997)2. By the definition of Bernanke and Mishkin 
implementation process follows the five main steps: 
1. Announcement of the mid-term quantitative targeted inflation level to the public by 
the central bank (central bank is always used as monetary authority). 
2. Price stability is supposed to be realized as the ultimate and primarily goal of 
monetary policy by an institutional commitment and other goals are subordinated. 
3. Setting the policy tools based on a comprehensive information strategy which 
includes not solely money aggregates and the interest rate but also does all 
economic variables. 
                                                 
2 Implementation process of inflation targeting regime defined in different numbers of steps. In this paper, we 
categorized it into five main steps. See also Bernanke, B. S., Mishkin, F. S. (1997): "Inflation targeting: A 
new framework for monetary policy" for details. 
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4. Communication with public, market institutions, other monetary authorities and 
monetary institutions is the key element in a successful inflation targeting process. 
Therefore, increasing the transparency in the way of communication with economic 
agents is one of the most important parts of implementation to achieve the target 
level. Thereby, monetary authority is supposed to declare the plans, objectives and 
decisions in a predetermined time horizons. 
5. Accountability of the Central Bank must be increased in order to attain the targeted 
inflation objectives. 
 
1.4. Critical Issues about Inflation Targeting 
 
By examining the steps, it can be seen that there are critical issues about a 
successful inflation targeting implementation period. In this part some technical issues are 
taken into consideration for a deeply look in the deciding process. 
 
1.4.1. Technical Issues: 
 
The initial step in inflation targeting implementation process is the measure of 
inflation rate being used. Choosing the right index which measures the basket including the 
key products, goods and services and excluding the alterations those affect the core 
inflation level in a negative way. Most common used index is Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
The leading advantage of using the consumer price index is being well known by the public 
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and being the eldest index among the measurement techniques. (Petursson, 2000). 
Additionally, an adjusted CPI contains some products those are not in the range of 
monetary policy and do not have permanent effect of inflation. Therefore, it becomes the 
conventional index being used by most of the countries. 
The following important issue about inflation targeting which leads the framework 
to achievement is the level of targeted inflation. In deciding about the numerical value of 
inflation, most commonly, monetary authority mentions ‘price stability’ as its policy goal. 
In this case, ‘price stability’ can be defined as low level of inflation that can be ignored in 
daily or short-term decisions by economic agents. There are two different aspects 
considering this issue. Some argues that, zero inflation targeting is the best way to make the 
inflation certain for economic agents, and then they can realize the changes in prices of 
related goods and services since there is a fluctuation in aggregate price levels. 
Dissimilarly, according to Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999), targeting a zero 
inflation rate creates some major problems. Since Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used as 
index, measurement can be biased upward. One of the reasons of this case is this 
measurement technique ignores the substitution effects, namely, an increase in a good or a 
service can make people to substitute  this product with a similar good or service with a 
lower price. This case does not reflect the consumer price index. Another reason to avoid 
the zero-level inflation targeting is, due to being a fixed-weighted basket measure; 
consumer price index cannot distinguish the price increase caused by an improvement 
quality from a price level increasing and reflects this rise as inflation. 
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On the other hand, instead of measurement, there are still some critiques about low 
level inflation. It is also stressed that low rate of inflation should protect real wages from 
decreasing since the nominal wages are rigid. Therefore, a significant fall in labor demand 
can be faced specifically in some sectors and this will lead the economy to an increasing 
unemployment level and additionally can hinder the reallocation of labor between different 
industries. To sum up, zero-inflation target can cause an increase in the natural rate of 
unemployment. Another argument about the low-level of inflation is inducing a low level 
of interest rates in nominal terms, thereby, in the case of a recession; low level of interest 
rates will challenge the central bank. These disadvantages of low-inflation level lead the 
central banks to set the targeted level above zero, for instances 1% to 3% rates annually. 
Another vital point for monetary authority on inflation targeting implementation is 
deciding about whether to aim a range or strict inflation level3. There are also two different 
approaches to this subject. The supporter of a strict point argues that a range should 
canalize the economic agents into an uncertainty in inflation expectations. On the other 
hand, Bernanke argues that a range, in stead of a strict point, is better for the economy in 
order to targeting a range let the central bank to be more flexible in implementing the 
monetary policy (1999)4. Additionally, a narrow range communicates more significant 
commitment by the monetary authority to be more close to the targeted objective than a 
broader range. Unfortunately this makes the central bank to overcome the unpredictable 
events more difficultly. Furthermore, besides the flexibility of range inflation level, missing 
                                                 
3 Point targeting or point level targeting terms are used to define strict inflation targeting level. 
4 Referred to ‘Inflation Targeting/Lessons from the International Experience’ written by Ben Bernanke, 
Thomas Laubach, Frederic S. Mishkin and Adam S. Possen in 1999. 
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a target range has a more negative impression on credibility of central bank than a case of 
missing a strict target level. 
Another operational issue about application process of inflation targeting is time 
horizons. Central Bank can set the target for one or more time horizons. Most commonly, 
monetary authorities aim inflation between one to four year ranges. Practically, targets less 
than one year, in other words short-term targeting, and more than four years are not 
meaningful, since inflation is a variable that cannot taken under control in short-run and 
similarly, to estimate and guarantee long-run price stabilization is not credible. To add, 
according to Batini and Nelson, central banks are supposed to design the inflation targeting 
framework in medium term to be achieved, as central banks could not respond the 
inflationary shocks in short-run, but they can absorb gradually (2000). Furthermore, there is 
a tradeoff between flexibility and transparency for the central bank in the case of a one to 
four year period. Because a targeting inflation stabilization requires a high level of 
transparency, declaration of the policies being and will be implemented to the economic 
agents will lower the freedom of monetary authority in short-term. 
Finally, the last technical issue mentioned is deciding the best time to start 
implementing inflation targeting framework. Although, inflation targeting by itself, is a 
policy aiming lowering the inflation level, the best time to start to implement the policy is 
the time when inflation level was already lower and falling in terms of credibility. To 
sustain the credibility in behalf of monetary authority and at the same time to ensure the 
political support, it is vital to choose the most convenient time in the way of being 
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successful in the initial periods. That support and credibility will lead the central bank to an 
achievement in the following periods. 
 
1.4.2. Communications Issues: 
 
Besides operational issues there are some critical points must be satisfied on 
communications issues. The more technical parts are playing important roles in success of 
framework, the more communications issues are vital steps, at least as important as the 
operational parts. 
First of all, what information should be declared to the public by the central bank 
has a significant weight in communication. The information shared with the other economic 
agents is supposed to retain credibility to the central bank. Therefore, central bank as the 
monetary authority is tended to notify the public including private sector about the 
monetary policy and the policy intentions. From a deeply perspective, the targeted inflation 
level, the policy strategy, panorama of the current economic conditions, records of the 
inflation and other economic parameters and estimations of both private sector and central 
bank itself. Besides this information, central bank is responsible to make the public known 
the tradeoffs in monetary policies. By this information system, the accountability of the 
central banks will strengthen.  
During the execution of the inflation targeting framework, a critical path is required 
to be followed to develop an analysis system. This communication path will let the central 
bank has a planned and regular database and reporting system which is required and helpful 
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for transparency and accountability. Laxton and Scott5 describe this communication path as 
the subsequent steps; a forecasting team will be engaged with a predetermined 
responsibilities. Second step is development of a database system that will assist to monitor 
and estimate short-run conjecture. These databases will make the reporting progression 
easier and that will sustain the consistency and transparency in the forecasting process. The 
following step is development of a periodical reporting system and formation of a storage 
area for written documents, and also these written documents will include a standardized 
set of tables and charts which are updated periodically and let the monetary authority have 
a command of ongoing developments in the economy. Additionally, by developing an 
uncomplicated form of the economy, monetary authority should use the model to realize the 
characteristics of the economy and in order to ensure some degree of macro consistency.  
Defining the implications of risk and uncertainty in the conjecture and stress this 
uncertainty to the Monetary Policy Committee and externally are the next steps in the way 
developing a strong communication within the central bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 This referred to the speech of Laxton and Scott in Inflation Targeting Conference of Central Bank of 
Republic of Turkey. To read the documentation of lecture visit the website: 
www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/evds/yayin/kitaplar/enf_kitap/1-Opening_Statement.pdf 
 
 17
2. Inflation Targeting and Other Monetary Regimes: 
 
 In this chapter, the advantages and disadvantages of inflation targeting framework 
will be explored and also compared to the other monetary policies like exchange rate 
targeting, monetary aggregate targeting and price level targeting. 
 
2.1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting: 
 
Economies those adopted inflation targeting as the monetary policy, not theoretical 
but in practice, most commonly experienced better macroeconomic results, for instance, 
sustaining a stable growth rate and lower inflation levels. However, such as other explicit 
monetary anchors, inflation targeting strategy has also numbers of negative impacts on the 
economy. 
  
2.1.1. Advantages of Inflation Targeting: 
 
I. Inflation targeting requires coordination between monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
Since the central bank has credibility significantly, a commitment between 
government, monetary authorities, trade unions and also private sector, leads the 
policy to achievement easier. Then, prices and wages should have more 
comprehensible reference parameter by an announced, predetermined inflation 
level, as a strengthening credibility of the monetary authority. Therefore, by a 
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particular success in targeted inflation level, economic conditions are closer to 
certainty more than other monetary policy-based economies. 
II. By implementing a forward-looking, announced, more transparent strategy, 
inflation targeting framework lets the monetary policy reduce the fluctuations in 
business cycle and as well, make the growth trend smoother. 
III. As preconditions and requirements during the implementation process of the 
inflation targeting regime require transparency, accountability and communication, 
the credibility of the central bank is reinforced within the process. 
IV. In the countries adopted inflation targeting, many optimistic effects on the 
macroeconomic variables are experienced, like reflecting in the lesser inflation rate 
accompanied by a declined level of inflationary expectations. In many countries this 
remarkable performance occurred concurrently with a decreased nominal effective 
exchange rate. 
V. Inflation risk premium reduces as a result of a decreased inflation level and also this 
reduction becomes imbedded in long-run interest rates. As a consequence of a lower 
level of real interest rate, investment levels and as well as permanent income 
become higher. 
VI. Due to better expected price levels, scared resources are allocated more efficiently 
within the economy. 
VII. During the inflation targeting period, central bank reports the forecasts, policy being 
implemented; policy tools will be executed to achieve the target, to the public. This 
accountability and transparency make the inflation targeting more understandable 
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and acceptable rather than older monetary policies for the public (Alparslan, 
Erdönmez, 2000). 
 
2.1.2. Disadvantages of Inflation Targeting: 
 
I. The inflation targeting policy must be implemented without tolerance and more 
rigidly than other monetary policies. Therefore, the structure of policy hinders 
economy respond to unpredictable shocks (Coric, 2007). 
II. Compared to other monetary policies, inflation targeting policy causes inefficient 
output stabilization. This case is generally faced in serious supply shocks, such like 
oil price shocks (Alparslan, Erdönmez, 2000). 
III. In short-run, output gap is a result of rigid inflation targeting policy, although in the 
long-run output is neutral and not effected by the policy. 
IV. As a requirement of the framework, flexible exchange rate regime should result as 
financial instability (Mishkin, 2001).  
V. To achieve the targeted level, in case of being above the targeted level, central bank 
executes limiting monetary policy measures, and vice versa and this alteration in 
monetary policy regime cause the income level fluctuate (Coric, 2007). 
VI. Inflation targeting should not prevent fiscal dominance (Alparslan, Erdönmez, 
2000). 
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2.2. General Features of Other Monetary Regimes: 
 
In this part, we will define what the monetary policy is and types of different types 
of monetary policies. Then, we will analyze the pros and cons of the monetary aggregate 
targeting and exchange rate targeting and price level targeting as the three main and strong 
competitive monetary policies to inflation targeting framework. The common feature of 
these two monetary policies; monetary aggregate targeting and exchange rate targeting, is 
both are focusing on an intermediate target, instead of a direct target as in inflation 
targeting and price level targeting, to achieve the ultimate goal, lower inflation rate. 
 
2.2.1. Definition and Types of Monetary Policy:  
 
Monetary policy is basically, the combination of the monetary tools designed by the 
monetary authority, generally central bank or government by controlling the money supply 
to achieve the monetary goals, for instances; low inflation rate, sustainable growth rate, 
exchange rate or a lower unemployment rate. There are numbers of ways to manage the 
money supply used by monetary authority; changing the volume of the money in the 
circulation, adjusting the reserve portions being hold by central bank reserves, changing the 
interest rates, trading the foreign currencies or instrument called open market operations 
and so on. 
There are different types of monetary policy called monetary regimes to achieve 
monetary targets. Inflation targeting, price level targeting, money aggregate targeting, 
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exchange rate targeting and mixed policy which is a combination of different types of 
monetary regimes, are the main monetary regimes6. Now, we will look at benefits and costs 
of price level targeting, exchange rate targeting and money aggregate targeting.  
Before, defining one by one table 1 summarizes the long term objectives and target market 
variables of each monetary regimes. 
Table 1: Types of Monetary Regimes and Long-Term Objectives 
Monetary Policy Target Market Variable Long-Term Objective 
Inflation Targeting 
Interest rate on 
overnight debt 
A given rate of change in 
the CPI 
Price Level Targeting 
Interest rate on 
overnight debt 
A specific CPI number 
Monetary Aggregates 
The growth in money 
supply 
A given rate of change in 
the CPI 
Exchange Rate Targeting 
The spot price of the 
currency 
The spot price of the 
currency 
Mixed Policy 
Usually interest rates 
 
Usually unemployment+ 
CPI change 
        Source: www.wikipedia.org 
                                                 
6 There is also income level targeting. Because there is no country adopted income level targeting as a 
monetary regime, there is no experience explaining advantages and disadvantages of income level targeting. 
That’s why it is not included. 
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2.2.1.1. Price Level Targeting: 
 
In inflation targeting, from the econometric perspective, there is a unit root in price 
levels and that makes it non-stationary. In other words, in inflation targeting framework the 
deviations of previous years’ inflation levels from targeted inflation level are not undone. 
Therefore, there is an increasing conditional variance of the future price in inflation 
targeting (Svensson, 2007)7. In price level targeting, the aim is to make the price level 
stable about a targeted price level. Because the price level has a deterministic trend parallel 
to a steady inflation, then it is a trend stationary series. There are two advantages of price 
level targeting with respect to the inflation targeting monetary regime: 
• Inflation targeting does not have a lower level uncertainty with respect to the price 
level targeting in the long-run. 
• It can be said that price level targeting has an automatic stabilization mechanism. 
Practically, when the price level is below the targeted rate, due to a higher expected 
inflation rate, the real interest rate decline, since the nominal interest rate is 
constant. The lower real interest rate will motivate the economy and price level will 
converge to the targeted level gradually (Svensson, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Svensson, Lars E. O., ‘Inflation Targeting’ 2007 version for details of alternative monetary regimes. 
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2.2.1.2. Exchange Rate Targeting: 
 
As the name of the policy suggests, in the exchange rate targeting policy, the 
adopting country targets a fixed exchange rate, namely fixing the domestic currency to a 
foreign currency that is a domestic currency of a reputable and credible country. In other 
words, by hedging the domestic currency by a foreign currency, the monetary authority 
adopting this regime, uses the credibility of the reputable country. Lower interest rate is an 
outcome of this regime and also it is most significant benefit of this regime; however the 
adopting country loses its independency.  There are also undesirable sides of a fixed 
exchange rate policy: 
• First of all, in the exchange rate targeting regime is more restrictive with respect to 
other monetary regimes. The opening exchange rate determined for fixing the 
domestic currency reflects to the overall attitude of policy in the short-run. There 
are still many discussions among the policy makers on calculating the best 
equilibrium point for the exchange rate. 
• In case of an idiosyncratic shock, the adopting country is supposed to increase the 
interest rates leading to a degree of tightness. 
• Beside these problems, the adopting country should face off a large output gap and 
a real exchange rate which could not be recovered in a rational time horizon, as the 
inflation rate converges. 
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2.2.1.3. Money Aggregate Targeting: 
 
It is also called as money-growth targeting. In money aggregate targeting regime, 
the adopting country controls the money supply to make the inflation rate converge to a 
lower and a stable level. Country experiences show that targeting money supply in order to 
move the inflation level down is not successful inflation stabilization way, practically 
(Svensson, 2007). Because the relation between money growth and inflation is not stable 
enough and undependable, thereby, to design the monetary policy based on the correlation 
between money growth and inflation rate does not lead the economy to achieve a 
satisfactory outcome. Above and beyond, the theory and the practices do not coincide; there 
exists some additional problems about money aggregate targeting: 
• To begin with, in practice, money aggregate targeting only stabilizes the money 
supply in the economy, not the inflation level or interest rates and also money 
demand. In case of instability due to a technical change, this encourages the 
economic agents, firms, banks, financial institutions and also individuals, to 
increase their money holdings. This challenges the economy in order to face off a 
significant level of money demand. 
• Moreover, in an economy, money supply should not be the main reason of the 
inflation problem. Then, a monetary regime based on a money supply could not 
work. 
• More to the point, it is possible that the economy should face up to a re-entry 
problem. When an inflationary shock occurs, to sustain the targeted money supply 
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level, the interest rates are increased, then, the economy shall slow down and as a 
result, the inflation rate converges to the determined level. But, this is not possible 
in the short-time. In this restricted time, the price level will have increased. The 
monetary authority will accommodate the change rate in prices, other than any 
following inflation. In other words, a once-off change in the money supply will 
occur in an inflationary shock, in money aggregate targeting regime, this type of 
change is strictly difficult. 
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3. Preconditions and Conditions for Inflation Targeting: 
 
Inflation targeting as a monetary regime has specific requirements before and 
during the implementation process. Because the framework based on an announced target 
level, to achieve the target, the central bank as the monetary authority adopting, is supposed 
to satisfy credibility, transparency, accountability, communication and flexibility conditions 
during the implementation period. Besides these, central bank is also supposed to be 
independent and economy is required to have strong financial markets as the preconditions 
before adopting the inflation targeting framework for the success of regime. Since inflation 
targeting regime is unlike to other monetary regimes affects expectations directly, and also 
these expectations shape actual inflation level and overall economic conditions in the 
country, the satisfaction of the preconditions and requirements has a vital role in order to 
have a rewarding outcome. The preconditions of transition process could be summarized as 
independency of monetary authority, strong and adequate financial markets. Additionally in 
the implementation process, credibility of the monetary authority, transparency and 
accountability to the public and also communication and flexibility are the requisites which 
lead the economy to achieve the targeted inflation level. In this part, these all preconditions 
and requirements will be analyzed. 
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3.1. Preconditions for Inflation Targeting Framework: 
 
Central bank independency and adequate financial markets are the prerequisites of 
inflation targeting monetary regime. By satisfying these prerequisites in the transition 
period, central bank inspires confidence which means less uncertainty; policy leads the 
economy to achieve the targeted objectives. 
 
3.1.1. Central Bank Independency: 
 
Fiscal dominance is the main obstacle for monetary policy to be implemented. 
Monetary policy and fiscal policy are supposed to be driven independently in order to have 
a robust economic environment. That’s why; independency of central bank has a higher 
level of importance.  
Independency of monetary authority could be defined as central bank is independent 
from government in operational and management issues. Supporters of central bank 
independency argue that political pressure encourage the economic cycles, like increasing 
the wage rates in election periods and thereby; speculates the economic environments. 
Therefore, an independent central bank guarantees a stable monetary policy regardless to 
political speculations. Additionally, independency bears credibility which is also an 
obligation in inflation targeting regime.  In absence of an independent central bank, since 
governments influence the monetary policy, a dependent monetary regime does not prevent 
short-term government from inflating the monetary aggregates.  
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In inflation targeting framework, the roles of monetary policy and fiscal policy must 
be defined clearly. In inflation targeting, although government does not interfere to 
monetary policy, agrees with the central bank about the numerical target, time horizons and 
price stabilization as the main objective of monetary policy. Then, government delegates 
instrumental authority to central bank in order to achieve the monetary targets and on the 
other side, government holds the central bank accountable for the monetary regime and its 
results to public (Demirhan, 2002)8. 
As mentioned at the beginning, fiscal dominance sets a bar against the monetary 
policy. To avoid fiscal dominance, it is required to lessen the public borrowing from central 
bank, have strong financial markets in order to reduce the responsibility of central bank in 
public borrowing, not to rely on the protection of seignorage, and also have a reduced 
public deficit (Demirhan, 2002). Why is fiscal dominance an obstacle for a robust monetary 
regime? It is needed to say, fiscal dominance has fateful and negative effects on money 
supply by upsetting the financial statements of central bank. In other words, it becomes 
more difficult for the central bank to control its financial statements, since fiscal policy 
dominates balance sheet items of central bank. In the absence of fiscal discipline, monetary 
policy is restricted.  This case leads the central bank to finance the public deficit taken root 
from fiscal policy.  
Furthermore, international organizations, such like IMF and World Bank, support 
central bank independency. That conviction increases the number of countries which define 
the role and authorization of central bank independently from fiscal authorities. Also, it can 
                                                 
8 See Demirhan, Erdal ‘Para Politikasinin Degisen Yuzu: Enflasyon Hedeflemesi’ (2002) for details about the 
preconditions of inflation targeting framework. 
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be added that, an independent central bank has higher scores and also it is more successful 
than the dependent monetary authority. 
To sum, it is inevitable to empower the central bank in decision-making and 
implementation process of monetary policy to achieve the targeted objectives and for a 
long-term stable monetary policy. 
 
3.1.2. Strong Financial Markets: 
 
To have strong and dynamic financial markets is another required pillar for the 
inflation targeting. It is the next step which is supposed to be satisfied in the transition 
period, before adopting the inflation targeting regime. In a way, the effectiveness of the 
monetary instruments designed by monetary authority depends on developed and dynamic 
financial, monetary, capital and foreign exchange markets. Since the financial markets are 
not adequate, they should not response to monetary tools not as quickly as requires and this 
belated reaction can also results as deviations from the targeted level. Deviation from the 
targeted level is the tender point of the inflation targeting framework which causes loss of 
credibility (Alparslan, Erdonmez, 2000)9. 
As mentioned in the previous precondition, independency of central bank, fiscal 
dominance is a barrier to monetary policy. In the case of insufficient financial markets, 
public borrowing should not be absorbed by the financial markets via trading stocks, bonds 
                                                 
9 See Alparslan, Melike; Pelin Ataman Erdonmez; ‘Enflasyon Hedeflemesi’ (2000) for details about 
preconditions and conditions in inflation targeting. 
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or other financial assets. Thereby; central bank takes the responsibility on financing public 
borrowing and this case creates fiscal dominance on monetary policy and leaves a limited 
room to the monetary authority during designation and implementation of monetary regime. 
Therefore; dynamic and strong financial markets could rank as a prerequisite of inflation 
targeting framework. 
 
3.2. Conditions for Inflation Targeting Framework: 
 
As mentioned above, as an economy satisfying the preconditions should adopt 
inflation targeting framework. However, there is a number of requisites can be counted 
during the adopting process itself. Credibility of the central bank, transparency, 
accountability, flexibility and communication as the main conditions will be analyzed in 
this part. 
 
3.2.1. Transparency: 
 
Transparency can be defined as the consequence of ‘the right to know’ of public. 
The central bank is supposed to have a high degree of transparency, simply, by issuing 
annual or quarterly reports about the policy tools, targets, forecasts on inflation, analyses of 
economic conditions and next steps in implementation by defining the following 
instruments will be used in order to achieve the targeted inflation level. 
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  This level of transparency is a concept come into being by the inflation targeting 
framework. Till 1990’s, generally, central banks prefer not to declare the monetary policy 
tools and targets to both public and private-sector, they impose secrecy on policy 
instruments. It is austere to figure out the logic lying behind this level of secrecy, but 
possibly, it can be assumed that high degree of transparency leaves an incapacitated room 
for monetary authority to change the monetary tools. Additionally, this degree of secrecy 
keeps the central bank away from the inquiry and pressure of both government and public 
(Svensson, 2007). What is the reason supporting the high degree of transparency in 
inflation targeting? It can explicitly be answered by recalling the distinctive feature of 
inflation targeting that leads the framework to achievement and distinguishes it from other 
monetary regimes, the concept of ‘controlling the expectations’. The inflation targeting 
framework by exhibiting the monetary instruments, targets, estimations and the future 
instrument settings abrogates the uncertainty and thereby; manages the expectations 
directly. These expectations affect the current and future economic parameters and 
conditions through shaping interest rates, current and future pricing decisions effectively 
(Svensson, 2007).  
To add that, transparency has a positive effect on credibility of monetary authority. 
As a consequence, this central bank credibility creates the credibility for inflation targeting 
regime, moreover, this regime credibility results as an achievement of the policy. 
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3.2.2. Accountability: 
 
Accountability is a requirement for both inflation targeting framework and 
independency of monetary authority. In inflation targeting, because central bank is 
independent in setting the monetary policy and its instruments, at the same time, it is the 
only responsible body from the success of monetary policy. Therefore, central bank 
announces the potential risks against success of monetary regime and also accounts to 
public, government and private sector about the deviations from targeted levels if occur. 
Additionally, in case of a deviation from targeted level, central bank also accounts for the 
reasons lying behind failure.  
In inflation targeting framework, central bank is not just responsible only for the 
public and government, but also have to account internally. As the target is not achieved, 
the policy-makers are supposed to declare the reasons to central bank. 
Accountability is related to transparency directly. Since central bank is transparent 
in its monetary policy, public, government and private sector should be aware of the 
policies being implemented and also should see the external inflationary risks which do not 
take root from monetary policy, such like oil price shocks. Then, central bank should assure 
economic agents that the deviations from targets are temporarily and not results of 
monetary policy, in the long-run targets are still authoritative (Demirhan, 2002)10.  
                                                 
10 Erdal Demirhan explained the preconditions of inflation targeting framework in two main concepts; 
credibility of central bank and accountability-transparency. Because transparency and accountability are two 
related prerequisites, explained together. 
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To add, accountability creates positive improvements in credibility. Economic 
agents, since the central bank is transparent in monetary policy instead of keeping the 
policy instrument secret; accredit the monetary regime. Therefore, inflationary expectations 
are replaced by low inflation expectations, and this case leads inflation targeting regime to 
achievement. 
 
3.2.3. Communication: 
 
Communication can be defined as the tools which central bank uses to provide 
accountability and transparency. Inflation reports are the basic communication tools being 
published periodically by most of the countries adopting inflation targeting framework. 
Most commonly, inflation reports are published quarterly or annually. Central bank 
announces the targets, forecasts and informs the public about the monetary instruments. 
Additionally, inflation reports include the potential risks against the targets and analyses on 
past and also future economic conditions (Demirhan, 2002).  
Another type of communication tools is public letters which central banks write to 
government and public. In the case of a deviation, most of the central banks adopting 
inflation targeting write a public letter -also it is called as open letter- explaining the 
reasons of deviations and what reaction central bank will take against the deviation 
(Svensson, 2007). Furthermore, these reports let the central bank to response the critics 
about its policy instruments and make it to maintain the credibility. Moreover, 
announcement of inflation targets via inflation reports decreases the uncertainty. 
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Another benefit of communication is to strength the commitment among central 
bank, private sector and public. The strong institutional commitment renders the central 
bank in order to be more independent from political pressure and fiscal dominance, to have 
full control over designing and implementing the monetary policy, therefore, as a 
consequence, to have the authorization to set the price stabilization as the main objective.  
To sum, we can say that for achievement communication is a requirement in 
inflation targeting and, vice versa, it can also be called that communication is an advantage 
of inflation targeting in the way increasing credibility. 
 
3.2.4. Flexibility: 
 
Flexibility can be defined as the ability of central bank to respond the 
macroeconomic fluctuations in order to achieve the targeted variables. In inflation targeting 
framework, there is a tradeoff between the flexibility and other requirements. Since 
transparency and accountability increases, the flexibility of central bank in its reactions 
against the unpredictable macroeconomic fluctuations decreases (Alparslan, Erdonmez, 
2000). In other words, because the central bank is responsible from monetary regime and 
achievement in targets, central bank is supposed to inform the public about the policy 
instruments. Therefore, in contrast the decorous secrecy, public and private sector are 
aware of the instruments and also the next steps of current monetary policy. Additionally, 
as a requirement of transparency and accountability which feed the credibility, central bank 
is supposed to account for any change in instruments or type of policy. Therefore, this 
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degree of accountability leaves a limited reaction room for the monetary policy, namely, a 
reduced flexibility rate is an inevitable consequence of high degree of accountability. That 
is the tradeoff mentioned between the concepts of transparency and flexibility. 
On the other hand, central bank is supposed to adjust the level of transparency and 
accountability in order not to decrease flexibility to signaling levels, however, both 
transparency and accountability are the main conditions for inflation targeting. Because in 
the case of an unpredictable macroeconomic shock, a reduction in flexibility more than 
required, creates higher leveled fluctuations in macroeconomic parameters. 
 
 3.2.5. Credibility of Central Bank: 
 
 It can be said that, the most vital requirement for the inflation targeting framework 
is to build and sustain the credibility of the central bank. Credibility of central bank means 
economic agents accredit that central bank should achieve what it stipulates. In other 
words, a central bank is credible for economic agents, if central bank was successful in past 
monetary regimes, did what they guaranteed and it is also adequate and enough powerful to 
control the economy and should cope with potential difficulties economy should face. 
 All prerequisites and conditions mentioned in this part are important in order to 
ensure and sustain the credibility of central bank. Independency, transparency, 
accountability and communication are the main pillars feed the credibility of central bank. 
In the first part, it is mentioned that, it is very important to start to implement the inflation 
targeting policy after the inflation rate has already started to decline. Since the inflation 
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curve has a downward trend, economic agents believe in a monetary policy which is aimed 
to decrease the inflation level as the primary objective. That’s why it is emphasized that a 
central bank should be more successful while adopting inflation targeting regime, if it starts 
to implement it as inflation curve starts to decrease. 
 In inflation targeting, credibility is a critical concept that must be satisfied before 
and during the implementing, and also it is the tender point of inflation targeting 
framework. That means if even a credible central bank deviates from targeted level 
unexpectedly, this fail unnerves the credibility and it is needless to say, this discrediting 
affects the expectations negatively. As a result of chain reaction, negative expectations lead 
the monetary policy to fail. As seems, credibility is the most critic, important and inevitable 
condition for the inflation targeting framework. 
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4. Inflation Targeting in Turkey: 
 
Turkey has adopted inflation targeting in 2006 officially, but inflation targeting 
process has started in 2002, by adopting hidden inflation targeting. Because preconditions 
of inflation targeting framework were not satisfied, The Central Bank of The Republic of 
Turkey did not announce the inflation targeting as the monetary regime in 2002. After some 
structural reforms and acceding inflation a downward trend, at the end of 2005, central 
bank of Republic of Turkey declared inflation targeting as monetary regime from 2006. 
Therefore, in this part, inflation targeting period of Turkey will be analyzed in two parts, 
hidden inflation targeting period between 2002 and 2005, inflation targeting period from 
2006.  
First, the implicit inflation targeting process between years 2002 and 2005 will be 
examined by focusing on the difficulties which The Central Bank of The Republic of 
Turkey faced, the overall economic conditions and premature conditions of inflation 
targeting regime and in the second part, the full-fledged inflation targeting process of 
Turkey will be analyzed by understanding the fluctuations in inflation rate and deviation 
from target in 200611. Additionally, the quarterly inflation reports published by The Central 
Bank of The Republic of Turkey will be analyzed. 
 
 
                                                 
11 In first part, hidden inflation targeting period, the challenges in the transition period are examined. The 
inflation fluctuations in the transition period are analyzed in the second part, together with the full-fledged 
inflation targeting period, from 2002 to 2007. 
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4.1. Implicit Inflation Targeting Period from 2002 to 2005: 
 
 Turkish economy faced an economic crisis in 2001; therefore the period after 2001 
should be called as the post-crisis period. Before 2001 crisis, the monetary policy was 
based on exchange rate targeting, namely, fixed exchange rate monetary policy was 
implemented by the central bank till February 2001. After the economic crisis boomed, 
monetary authority switched to a floating exchange rate system. Up till 2001, a number of 
different monetary policies were adopted, but, none of them cracked to the chronicle 
inflation problem in Turkish economy. The Central Bank of The Republic of Turkey chose 
to adopt the inflation targeting regime which has significant macroeconomic outcomes in 
adopting countries, but there are many preconditions and conditions must be satisfied to 
reach the expected outcomes. Because adopting inflation targeting regime without 
satisfying the conditions should bear problems instead of curing the inflation illness, 
monetary authority applied an implicit inflation targeting framework instead of full-fledged 
version, and spend the transition period to satisfy the conditions and prerequisites. Central 
Bank faced a number of difficulties during this transition period like fiscal dominance, high 
public debt, volatile risk premium, uncertainty and loss of credibility; however Turkey has 
significant advantages in independency of monetary authority. 
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4.1.1. Difficulties of Central Bank in Transition Period: 
 
 During the transition period, central bank faced a number of difficulties like fiscal 
dominance, loss of credibility, volatile risk premium and insufficient database system. It 
was difficult for the central bank to bypass another monetary regime after fixed exchange 
rate system. Economic conditions of post-crises period were not eligible for adopting the 
inflation targeting framework. That’s why; the transition period was inevitable for Turkish 
economy in order to ensure the preconditions of inflation targeting policy.  
 First, challenge for the central bank is lack of fiscal discipline. As discussed in the 
previous chapters, fiscal dominance is the most critical challenge to monetary policy. In 
case of fiscal dominance, central bank is not able to adopt the monetary policy 
independently. Due to high public debt ratios, refinancing the debts and to maintain its 
sustainability become preferential for the economy. Therefore, in post-crises period 
monetary policy was not driven regardless to fiscal policy. Graph 1 shows the ratio of net 
public debt to gross national product in crisis and post-crisis years, 2000, 2001 and 2002. It 
can be observed that in 2001, debt ratio ascended to 90.5% and in 2002, this ratio was about 
78.5%. These high public debt ratios caused a critical obstacle in order to implement a full-
fledged inflation targeting regime, since monetary regime was dominated by fiscal policy. 
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Graph 1: Public Debt Ratio 
 
 
Source: Treasury 
Beside high public debt ratio, volatile risk premium is another problem of the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey during the transition period. What is the problem 
with volatile risk premium? What does the volatile risk premium cause? Volatile risk 
premium sets a bar against controlling the inflation and also limits the adequacy of central 
bank to estimate the future inflation performance. In case of a volatile risk premium, 
exchange rate variability increases. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to control the 
inflation for monetary authority. Not only to control the future inflation fluctuations but 
also uncertain time horizons appeared as another difficulty as a result of volatile risk 
premium. Remember that, in inflation targeting, it is also important to make the future 
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inflation certain for a determined time horizon. In existence of variable risk premium, the 
central bank should forecast the inflation in limited time horizons, like a couple of months 
which is not an adequate period for implementing the inflation targeting framework. 
Moreover, loss of credibility was another obstacle in transition period. As 
mentioned before, Turkey faced an economic crisis in 2001. As a result of an economic 
crisis and also due to high inflation levels before 2001 expected inflation levels were 
significantly high. Economic agents properly had inflationary expectations in the post-crisis 
period. In hidden inflation targeting period, uncertainty was not just about expectations of 
economic agents, but also occurred in the forecasts of central bank. In the transition period, 
insufficient data sources created problems for the central bank. Expected inflation surveys 
were reflecting the expectations overall, not specifying the central bank’s forecasts. 
Because a robust database system is a must in inflation targeting regime, these ineffective 
data challenged the central bank in forecasts. Also, it is supposed to be added, changing the 
methodology and basket of consumer price index in 2004 increased the uncertainty about 
expectations (Kara, 2006)12. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Kara, Hakan; ‘Turkish Experience with Implicit Inflation Targeting’ (2006) for the details about the 
challenges faced in implicit inflation targeting period. 
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4.1.2. Structural Reforms in Implicit Inflation Targeting Period: 
 
 The next question is although these difficulties how did the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey has successful outcomes? The answer is structural reforms, increasing 
credibility by implementing a robust monetary policy and amended the Central Bank Law 
in order to increase independency. 
 Although the difficulties mentioned in the previous part, the Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey had a big advantage in independency. The changes in the central bank 
law in April 2001 empowered the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey fully authorized 
to design and implement the monetary policy and policy instrument. According to renewed 
law, the Central bank of the Republic of Turkey is also required to inform the public about 
monetary policy which improves accountability. Furthermore, this law also includes central 
bank is supposed to account for the deviations from targets. Additionally, this law set the 
primarily objective of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey as achieve and maintain 
the price stability (Kara, 2006)13. 
 Moreover, during the transition period, central bank increased its credibility. Under 
normal circumstances, since the inflationary expectations come into being, central bank 
generally prefers to increase the interest rates to meet the targets. In contrast, the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Turkey never increased the interest rates during the implicit 
inflation targeting period, preferred fiscal reforms rather than using the interest rates as a 
policy tool. This attitude of central bank created and improved its credibility. 
                                                 
13 Also the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey declared that the primarily objective of central bank is to 
maintain price stabilization via its website. Visit www.tcmb.gov.tr for details. 
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4.2. Inflation Targeting Period in Turkey after 2006: 
 
 The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey declared to bypass the inflation 
targeting regime at the end of 2005 and started to adopt from 2006. Kara explains the 
transition steps as follows (2006); 
1. The database system was renewed. Projections focused on new inflation dynamics 
and monetary transmission mechanism. The restructured techniques are modified to 
improve the policy analyses and forecasts. 
2. Monetary policy committee meetings settled periodically. In these meetings, the 
policy being adopted and will be adopted, are decided and announced to public. 
Not only the policies but also fixed meeting dates are declared to public as a result 
of accountability and in order to eliminate the uncertainty.   
3. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey started to publish inflation reports 
quarterly and financial stability reports twice a year on previously announced dates 
as requirement of communication condition. This reports aim to inform the public 
about ‘what central bank is doing’. 
What do this inflation reports include? Actually, inflation reports are published by 
the central bank to inform the public about overview of the economy, outlook to future, 
inflation developments and also supply and demand developments. They also analyze the 
financial markets and financial mediations, budget developments, and medium term 
forecasts including the risk factors against the achievement of monetary policy. 
Additionally, in the case of a deviation from targets, central bank is responsible to state the 
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reasons in inflation reports. Moreover, central bank announces the monetary policy 
committee meeting dates. It is needless to say, these reports improve transparency and 
communication to public. 
 
 4.3. Positive Trend in Inflation Rate: 
 
 During the transition period, the structural reforms and adoption of three-year 
budget planning have positive effects in expectations. Not only these structural changes, but 
also progress in the European Union membership, enhanced financial stability, money 
reforms14, decrease in medium and long-term real interest rates and sustained fiscal 
discipline also lead the inflation rate to a decrease gradually (CBRT, 2006-I)15.  
 The outcomes of both implicit and full-fledged inflation targeting framework are 
significantly successful. At the end of 2001, after February 2001 economic crisis the 
inflation rate was 68%, and at the end of implicit period, in 2005, the inflation rate was 
7.72%, 9.65% at the end of 2006. Table 2 and also Graph 2 sum up the annual percentage 
change in consumer price index (CPI). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Printing New Turkish Lira. 
15 The inflation reports published by the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey are used as a reference to 
these inflation analyses. The inflation reports are published quarterly, therefore 2006-I refers to the inflation 
report of the first quarter of 2006. 
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Table 2: Percentage Change in CPI 
Annual Rate of Change (%) 
Year Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2005 9.23 8.69 7.94 8.18 8.7 8.95 7.82 7.91 7.99 7.52 7.61 7.72
2006 7.93 8.15 8.16 8.83 9.86 10.1 11.7 10.3 10.6 9.98 9.86 9.65
2007 9.93 10.16 10.86 10.7 9.23 8.6 6.9           
           Source: CBRT  
 
Graph 2:  Annual Percentage Change in Consumer Price Index (2003=100) 
 
        Source: CBRT 
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 During the hidden inflation targeting period and inflation targeting period, the 
Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey announced the targeted inflation rates as 35% in 
2002, 20% in 2003, 12% in 2004, 8% in 2005, and 5% in 2006, 4% in 2007 and 2008 with 
2% uncertainty band (CBRT, 2006-III). In inflation reports, central bank also announces 
the expectations, forecast range, medium target levels and output gap rates. Graph 3 shows 
the expectations of central bank about 2007, 2008 and 2009.  
 
Graph 3: Inflation and Output Gap Forecasts  
 
     
 
 Source: CBRT 
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As seems, in 2006, the targeted inflation level is 5% with uncertainty band 2%, in 
other words, according to range targeting inflation at the end of 2006, the actual inflation 
level was supposed to be between 3% and 7% with a mid-point 5%. In contrast, the actual 
inflation level measured as 9.65%. 2.65% deviation below the upper bound 7% occurred. In 
inflation report of forth quarter of 2006, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey 
declared the causes of deviation as a result of: 
• Supply shocks such as the rapid increase in tobacco and unprocessed food 
• Capital outflows originated from the deterioration of global liquidity 
conditions 
• Unpredictable fluctuations in international oil and gold prices. 
Although there is a deviation from target, 2006 was a successful year in improving 
the transparency, accountability and predictability, which are the main principles of the 
inflation targeting regime. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 Inflation targeting is a new and comprehensive framework with its specific 
requirements, like credibility, accountability, transparency and independency of the 
monetary authority. Additionally, it is a framework with successful macroeconomic 
outcomes experienced in adopting countries. The significant difference of inflation 
targeting that distinguishes it from other monetary regimes is its ability to affect the 
expectations directly by the preannouncement of the targeted inflation level which 
eliminates uncertainty. 
 At the time being, there are more than twenty countries including Turkey that 
adopted inflation targeting as the monetary regime. Because of not satisfying the primarily 
preconditions of inflation targeting framework, Turkey has spent a transition period 
between 2002 and 2005 called implicit or hidden inflation targeting period. It has to be 
stated that the transition period is useful and effective in the countries which has high 
inflation levels and faced loss of credibility of monetary authority in order to complete the 
requirements, build up and improve the credibility of central bank. Also, the transition 
period helps to lead the high and chronicle inflation level to a downward trend. By recalling 
the critical point of the framework, the best time to adopt the inflation targeting is the time 
when the inflation level has already started to decrease, however the aim of the inflation 
targeting is primarily to maintain the price stabilization by a low inflation rate, in other 
words, curing the chronicle high inflation illness. Therefore, transition period is inevitable 
and also helpful for the countries faced high inflation levels for long periods, like Turkey. 
 49
 Furthermore, it seems from the Turkish experience, independency of the monetary 
authority is more important than satisfying the other conditions of inflation targeting 
framework by keeping the monetary policy away from fiscal dominance. In the case of a 
fiscal discipline, it becomes easier to achieve the monetary targets.   
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